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Abstract 
The purpose of this research was to assess Navy contracting professionals’ 
procurement fraud knowledge, as well as contract management processes and related 
internal controls, and to analyze their perceptions regarding their organization’s procurement 
fraud susceptibility. This research study utilized a previously developed web-based survey 
designed to assess the DoD procurement workforce’s knowledge of procurement fraud 
schemes, internal controls, and contract management processes as well as their 
perceptions of fraud susceptibility in each of these areas. Based on the research findings, 
the Navy may be lacking auditability in their organizations due to a lack of procurement 
fraud knowledge. Recommendations are provided to the Navy and DoD regarding 
increasing the procurement fraud knowledge of their contracting professionals in order to 
help decrease procurement fraud vulnerabilities within their organizations. As DoD agencies 
continue to strive for accountability, integrity, and transparency in their procurement of 
goods and services, procurement fraud knowledge and auditability will continue to increase 
in importance. 
Background 
The Department of Defense (DoD) procurement workforce manages millions of 
contract actions, and billions of public dollars are spent on supplies and services in order to 
achieve the mission of the DoD (“Federal Procurement,” 2017). The DoD must ensure that 
each tax dollar, hard-earned by the American people, is being spent appropriately with the 
highest degree of public trust.  
The Department of Defense Inspector General (DoDIG) and the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) have identified issues such as lack of adequately trained 
contracting personnel, lack of capable contract management processes, and lack of 
effective contract management internal controls within the federal government (DoDIG, 
2009, 2014; GAO, 2013). These contract management issues may make the DoD 
vulnerable to procurement fraud (Rendon, R. G., & Rendon, 2015).  
With procurement fraud cases on the rise, in order to achieve its mission, it is 
important that the DoD procurement workforce have the necessary procurement fraud 
knowledge to properly manage the procurement function with integrity, accountability, and 
transparency (Cohen & Eimicke, 2008; Thai, 2014). Analyzing the procurement fraud 
knowledge level of Navy contracting professionals and making recommendations for 
improvement of procurement fraud education within the Navy, as well as within the DoD, can 
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help ensure that taxpayer funds are used effectively and help ensure the public interest is 
protected. Integrity, accountability, and transparency in federal government procurement are 
crucial.  
The purpose of this research was to assess Navy contracting professionals’ 
procurement fraud knowledge, as well as contract management processes and related 
internal controls, and to analyze their perceptions regarding their organization’s procurement 
fraud susceptibility. The research questions for this study include the following: 
1. What is the Navy contracting professionals’ procurement fraud knowledge 
level of procurement fraud schemes as related to contract management 
processes, internal control components, and procurement fraud scheme 
categories? 
2. What is the Navy contracting professionals’ perception of procurement 
fraud as related to the contract management processes, internal control 
components, and procurement fraud scheme categories? 
As the DoD works toward being audit ready for a financial statement audit in 
FY2018, auditability is of utmost importance. For an organization to be auditable, it should 
ensure that its people are competent, its processes are capable, and its internal controls are 
effective (Rendon, J. M., & Rendon, 2016). Competent people, which is the focus of this 
research, are one of the components of the auditability triangle (Rendon, J. M., & Rendon, 
2016).  
Literature Review 
This section provides a brief literature review that sets the groundwork for this 
research study. Scholarly journal articles, professional journal articles, government reports, 
and previous research studies in the areas of auditability, contract management phases, 
internal controls, and procurement fraud scheme categories are discussed. The following 
sections address auditability, contract management phases, internal control components, 
procurement fraud scheme categories. 
Auditability 
Auditability occurs at different levels of an organization and flows from the lowest 
level of an organization upwards. The process of “making things auditable” requires 
organizations to establish and actively manage an institutionally acceptable knowledge 
management system supporting its governance of processes and practices (Power, 1996, p. 
289). Rollins and Lanza (2005) support the need for an increased emphasis on effective 
internal controls due to an increase in procurement fraud cases. In addition, Crawford and 
Helm (2009) contend that public sector governance is important to ensure a commitment to 
compliance, accountability, and transparency. Prior research supports the importance of 
competent personnel and competent organizations related to capable processes in order to 
ensure successful procurement projects (Frame, 1999). 
In response to internal control weaknesses and resulting procurement process 
deficiencies, the DoD is trying to increase its emphasis on procurement training and the 
development of procurement workforce competencies (GAO, 2002) as well as auditability in 
its procurement organizations. Auditability within federal government organizations is 
necessary in order to ensure the integrity, accountability, and transparency of its 
procurement programs, fight the battle against procurement fraud, and ensure value for 
money (Rendon, R. G., & Rendon, 2015).  
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As reflected in Figure 1, R. G. Rendon and Rendon (2015) contend that auditability 
encompasses competent personnel, capable processes, and effective internal controls. 
Having competent people includes personnel having appropriate education, adequate 
training, and relevant experience. The focus of this research is on competent personnel in 
terms of procurement fraud knowledge.  
 
Figure 1. Auditability Triangle 
(Rendon, R. G., & Rendon, 2015) 
Contract Management Phases 
Rendon and Snider (2008) state that the contract management phases include pre-
award, award, and post-award. The pre-award phase consists of the procurement planning, 
solicitation planning, and solicitation processes, which are discussed in the following 
sections.  
Pre-Award: Procurement Planning. Procurement planning is a vital aspect of 
contract management as it encompasses key activities such as defining the requirement, 
conducting market research, developing budgets and cost estimates, and conducting risk 
analysis (Rendon, J. M., & Rendon, 2015). 
Pre-Award: Solicitation Planning. Solicitation planning includes key activities such 
as determining the procurement method and contract type, developing the solicitation 
document, determining the contract-award strategy, and finalizing the solicitation (Rendon, 
J. M., & Rendon, 2015). 
Pre-Award: Solicitation. The solicitation process involves obtaining information 
(proposals) from the sellers regarding how project needs can be met (Rendon, R. G., 2008).  
Award: Source Selection. The source selection process includes key activities such 
as applying evaluation criteria to the management, cost, and technical proposals, 
negotiating with suppliers, and executing the contract award strategy (Garrett, 2013; 
Rendon, R. G., 2008).  
Post-Award: Contract Administration. The contract administration process 
involves key activities such as conducting a pre-performance conference, monitoring the 
contractor’s work results, measuring the contractor’s performance, and managing the 
contract change control process (Rendon, R. G., 2008). 
Post-Award: Contract Closeout. The contract closeout process includes key 
activities such as processing government property dispositions, finalizing acceptance of 
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products or services, making final contractor payments, and documenting the contractor’s 
final past-performance report (Rendon, R. G., 2008). In addition to capable contracting 
processes, effective internal controls are also important for federal agencies to become 
more auditable (Rendon, R. G., & Rendon, 2015).  
Internal Control Components 
Effective internal controls ensure the organization is “[complying] with laws and 
regulations, monitoring procedures to assess enforcement, and reporting material 
weaknesses” (Rendon, R. G., & Rendon, 2015, p. 716). In May 2013, the Committee of 
Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) updated its internal control 
integrated framework, which now includes 17 principles within the five components of 
internal control (COSO, 2013). In September 2014, the GAO updated its Standards for 
Internal Control for the Federal Government (Green Book; GAO, 2014). Figure 2 illustrates 
the five components of internal control (COSO, 2013, p. 6). 
 
Figure 2. Relationship of Internal Control Objectives and Components  
(COSO, 2013, p. 6) 
Figure 3 illustrates all of the 17 principles associated with each of the five internal 
control components. The five components of the integrated internal control framework are 
discussed in the following sections (COSO, 2013).  
Control Environment. The control environment component of the integrated internal 
control framework sets the tone at the top and is related to the integrity and ethical behavior 
of the organization’s management (COSO, 2013).  
Risk Assessment. The risk assessment component of the integrated internal control 
framework involves assessing what could go wrong within the organization and what 
management can do to mitigate any potential risks, including fraud risks (COSO, 2013; 
GAO, 2014).  
Control Activities. The control activities component of the integrated internal control 
framework incorporates all of the control procedures that the organization needs to 
implement in order to reach its goals and objectives (COSO, 2013).  
Information and Communication. The information and communication component 
of the integrated internal control framework includes internal and external communications 
as well as the accounting system (COSO, 2013).  
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Monitoring Activities. The monitoring activities component of the integrated internal 
control framework entails the close observation of all of the other internal control 
components to ensure that the controls are being practiced appropriately (COSO, 2013).  
 
Figure 3. COSO’s 17 Fundamental Principles 
(COSO, 2013, p. 6) 
Procurement Fraud Scheme Categories  
Internal controls that are not appropriately mandated and implemented may leave 
the federal government vulnerable to procurement fraud. Tan (2013) found that incidents of 
procurement fraud in the DoD and the federal government could be traced to ineffective 
internal controls, which left government organizations vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse. 
The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), a fraud-fighting organization, defines 
fraud as “a knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact to 
induce another to act to his or her detriment” (ACFE, 2016, para. 2). In the 1940s, after 
interviewing embezzlers in jail, Cressey (1972), a criminologist, found that that the 
embezzlers had a perceived pressure (motivation), a perceived opportunity, and a 
justification (rationalization) in common, now known as the fraud triangle (Wells, 2001). The 
fraud triangle is illustrated in Figure 4 (Albrecht, 2014). 
 
Figure 4. Fraud Triangle 
(Albrecht, 2014, para. 1) 
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While there are numerous fraud schemes, they can be categorized into six major 
procurement fraud scheme categories, which are illustrated in Table 1 (Rendon, J. M., & 
Rendon, 2015).  
Collusion. Collusion is “a situation where two or more employees work together to 
commit fraud by overcoming a well-designed internal control system” (Wells, 2005, p. 122). 
The collusion fraud scheme category includes procurement fraud schemes such as 
kickbacks, bribery, and deliberate split purchases (Rendon, J. M., & Rendon, 2015).  
Bid Rigging. Bid rigging “is a process by which an employee assists a vendor to 
fraudulently win a contract through the competitive bidding process” (Wells, 2005, p. 283). 
Bid-rigging schemes include collusion bidding by contractors, excluding qualified bidders, 
leaking bid data, manipulation of bids, rigged specifications, and unbalanced bidding 
(Rendon, J. M., & Rendon, 2015).  
Conflict of Interest. Conflict of interest is “when an employee, manager, or 
executive has an undisclosed economic or personal interest in a transaction that adversely 
affects the company” (Wells, 2005, p. 273). Conflict of interest fraud schemes include 
conflicts of interest, unjustified sole source awards, and phantom vendors (Rendon, J. M., & 
Rendon, 2015).  
Billing, Cost, and Pricing Schemes. Billing, cost, and pricing schemes involve 
“fraudulent payment by submitting invoices for fictitious goods or services, inflated invoices, 
or invoices for personal purchases” (Wells, 2005, p. 98). Billing, cost, and pricing schemes 
include such things as cost mischarging; defective pricing; change order abuse; co-mingling 
of contracts; false, inflated, or duplicate invoices; and false statement claims (Rendon, J. M., 
& Rendon, 2015).  
Fraudulent Purchases. Fraudulent purchases involve purchasing “personal items 
with company money” (Wells, 2005, p. 114). Fraudulent purchases include purchases for 
personal use or resale, unnecessary purchases, and imprest fund abuse (Rendon, J. M., & 
Rendon, 2015). GAO (2002) found that fraudulent purchases occur in the government 
purchase card programs within the federal government.  
Fraudulent Representation. Fraudulent representation includes failure to meet 
contract specifications and product substitution (Rendon, J. M., & Rendon, 2015). Product 
substitution is also known as “bait and switch.”  
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Table 1. Categories of Procurement Fraud Schemes  
(Rendon, J. M., & Rendon, 2015) 
 
Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework for this research entails the auditability triangle. R. G. 
Rendon and Rendon (2015) contend that “the theory of auditability incorporates aspects of 
governance which emphasizes effective internal controls, capable processes, and 
competent personnel” (p. 715). These major elements of the auditability triangle, which are 
illustrated in Figure 1, present the conceptual framework for this research and focus on the 
competent personnel element. 
In order for federal procurement organizations to be auditable, they need to have 
competent people, capable processes, and effective internal controls. Since contracting 
professionals play an essential role in the procurement process, they have unique 
opportunities for detecting and deterring procurement fraud. However, without proper and 
adequate knowledge of procurement fraud schemes, as well as effective internal controls 
and capable contracting processes, these contracting professionals may not be able to deter 
or detect significant procurement fraud activities within the federal government 
organizations.  
Research Methodology 
The research methodology for this research study includes a literature review 
covering contract management phases, internal control components, and procurement fraud 
schemes. The literature review consists of the GAO reports as well as nongovernmental 
literature and scholarly articles. Furthermore, this research methodology involved the use of 
a previously developed knowledge assessment tool that was used to assess Navy 
contracting professionals.  
The web-based assessment tool includes 27 knowledge-based questions regarding 
contracting processes, internal controls, and procurement fraud schemes. In addition, the 
assessment tool also includes 12 organization-based questions related to the contracting 
officers’ perceptions of internal controls within their organizations. These survey questions 
were designed to assess the contracting officers’ perceptions of their organizations 
regarding susceptibility to fraudulent activity. The organization-based items were adopted 
and modified from the Internal Control Survey developed by the New York State Internal 
Control Association (NYSICA, 2006).  
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After following the appropriate Institutional Review Board (IRB) procedures and 
obtaining the protocol approval from the Naval Postgraduate School IRB office, the web-
based assessment tool was deployed using the Naval Postgraduate School online survey-
hosting service LimeSurvey. The survey link was e-mailed to a Navy-designated person who 
was not in the chain of command, who forwarded the e-mail message with the web link to 
the Navy contracting professionals at a Navy contracting command. The web-based 
assessment tool was available for a four-week period. Based on the research findings, 
recommendations are made to the Navy and the DoD for improving its contracting 
professionals’ procurement fraud knowledge as well as its contract management processes 
and internal controls.  
Research Findings 
The web-based assessment tool was deployed on January 26, 2016, to a total 
eligible population of 82 Navy contracting professionals located at a Navy contracting 
command. The assessment tool was initiated by 44 respondents, and was completed by 32 
respondents, resulting in a response rate of 39% (Grennan & McCrory, 2016).  
All of the 32 respondents were Navy civilian contracting professionals. Figures 5–7 
reflect demographics of the respondents. The figures show the number of respondents as 
well as the percentage. For example, 1, 3% for the 11 to 20 years category in Figure 5 
indicates one respondent, which was 3% of the total respondents had 11 to 20 years of 
experience. Regarding the experience level, the majority of the respondents (10 
respondents, 32%) had 0–2 years of experience. Regarding their DAWIA levels shown in 
Figure 6, the majority of the respondents (15 respondents, 47%) had DAWIA Certification 
Level II, and 22% (7 respondents) had no DAWIA certification levels. Regarding their 
warrant status shown in Figure 7, the majority of the respondents (78.13%) did not have a 
warrant. 
 
Figure 5. Number of Participants by Years of Experience  
(Grennan & McCrory, 2016) 
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Figure 6. Number of Participants by DAWIA Certification Level  
(Grennan & McCrory, 2016) 
 
Figure 7. Percentage of Participants by Warrant Status  
(Grennan & McCrory, 2016) 
The average score on the knowledge portion of the web-based assessment tool was 
58% correct of the 27 knowledge-based questions. Figures 8–10 reflect the average score 
based on years of experience level, DAWIA certification level, and warranted contracting 
officer status. As contracting experience and DAWIA level increases, so does the average 
score on the knowledge assessment.  
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Figure 8. Average Score by Years of Experience  
(Grennan & McCrory, 2016) 
 
Figure 9. Average Score by DAWIA Level  
(Grennan & McCrory, 2016) 
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Figure 10. Average Score by Warrant Status  
(Grennan & McCrory, 2016) 
As previously stated, each knowledge assessment question was related to contract 
management processes, internal control components, and procurement fraud schemes. 
Figures 11–13 reflect the average score based on each of these areas. From the 
perspective of the contract management process as shown in Figure 11, assessment 
knowledge questions related to the procurement planning process had the highest average 
score, compared to questions related to contract closeout, which had the lowest score. From 
the perspective of the internal control components as shown in Figure 12, assessment 
knowledge questions related to the control environment component had the highest average 
score, compared to questions related to information and communication, which had the 
lowest score. From the perspective of procurement fraud schemes as shown in Figure 13, 
assessment knowledge questions related to bid rigging scheme had the highest average 
score, compared to questions related to conflict of interest schemes, which had the lowest 
score. 
 
Figure 11. Average Score by Contract Management Process  
(Grennan & McCrory, 2016) 
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Figure 12. Average Score by Internal Control Component  
(Grennan & McCrory, 2016) 
 
Figure 13. Average Score by Procurement Fraud Scheme  
(Grennan & McCrory, 2016) 
Analysis of Organizational Perception Findings 
The web-based assessment tool also included survey questions related to the 
participants’ perceptions of their organization’s susceptibility to vulnerabilities to 
procurement fraud within the contract management phases, internal control components, 
and procurement fraud schemes. Figures 14–16 reflect the responses to these assessment 
questions.  
As shown in Figure 14, when asked which contract management phase is most 
vulnerable to fraud in their organization, the contract administration phase was selected the 
most often (21.88%) and procurement planning, solicitation planning, and source selection 
were all selected the least often (0% for each one). Approximately 19% responded that they 
did not know, approximately 44% of the respondents stated they did not suspect fraud, and 
approximately 3% responded that they preferred not to answer.  
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As shown in Figure 15, when asked which internal control component is most 
vulnerable to fraud in their organization, the monitoring activities component was selected 
the most often (13%) and control environment was selected the least often (0%). 
Approximately 22% responded that they did not know, approximately 47% of the 
respondents stated they did not suspect fraud, and approximately 6% responded that they 
preferred not to answer. 
As shown in Figure 16, when asked to which procurement fraud scheme they 
perceived their organization was most susceptible, collusion and conflict of interest were 
selected the most often (6.25% each) and bid rigging was selected the least often (0%). 
Approximately 19% responded that they did not know, approximately 53% of the 
respondents stated they did not suspect fraud, and approximately 6% responded that they 
preferred not to answer. 
 
Figure 14. Percentage of Responses to Contract Management Phase Perception 
Question  
(Grennan & McCrory, 2016) 
 
Figure 15. Percentage of Responses to Internal Control Component Perception 
Question  
(Grennan & McCrory, 2016) 
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Figure 16. Percentage of Responses to Procurement Fraud Scheme Perception 
Question  
(Grennan & McCrory, 2016) 
Nine of the organizational questions were related to the contracting professionals’ 
perceptions of their organization’s internal controls and were designed to determine if any 
aspects of the organizations’ internal control structure, processes, or culture made the 
organization more susceptible to fraudulent activity. The Likert Scale responses ranged from 
1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree). The average response mean to all of the nine 
questions was 4.24, and the range of responses was from 3.66 to 4.72. The lowest 
response mean (3.66) was for the item “I have adequate knowledge of contracting fraud 
schemes to perform my duties.” Zero respondents answered “I Don’t Know.” The highest 
response mean (4.72) was for the item “I would report fraudulent or suspicious activity if I 
saw or suspected it.” Zero respondents answered “I Don’t Know.”  
Implications of Findings 
The results of both the knowledge assessment and the organization perception 
assessment have interesting implications. The contracting professionals’ average score on 
the overall knowledge assessment (58%) indicates a possible knowledge deficiency in 
procurement phases, internal controls, and procurement fraud schemes. This finding, along 
with the average response mean to the organization perception item “I have adequate 
knowledge of contracting fraud schemes to perform my duties” of 3.66, suggests that 
perhaps the contracting professionals are overly optimistic in self-assessing their knowledge 
of procurement fraud schemes.  
Furthermore, a significant percentage of the respondents indicated “I do not suspect 
fraud” in relation to the organization’s contracting phases (43.75%), internal control 
components (46.88%), and procurement fraud scheme susceptibility (53.13%). These 
findings, along with the low scoring knowledge assessment may indicate that although the 
majority of contracting professionals do not suspect fraud in their organizations, they also do 
not have a sufficient working knowledge of procurement fraud. The contracting 
professionals’ limited knowledge of procurement fraud and their perception that their 
organization is not susceptible to fraud may reveal that the organization could in fact be 
vulnerable to some form of procurement fraud. An example of this type of vulnerability to 
procurement fraud can be found in the Fat Leonard case, which is still currently under 
investigation.  
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Recommendations 
The results of the knowledge-based assessment indicated that, although the average 
score was 58%, the contracting professionals’ knowledge of contracting processes, internal 
controls, and procurement fraud schemes increases as years of experience and DAWIA 
certification level increase. Recent research shows that the DAWIA required courses for 
contracting certification do not include a mandatory fraud training or awareness course 
(Castillo & Flannigan, 2014). The first recommendation is for the Defense Acquisition 
University (DAU) to incorporate coverage of internal controls and procurement fraud 
schemes in the mandatory contracting curriculum.  
Another recommendation is to further explore the organization’s information and 
communication internal control component and improve monitoring activities. Yet another 
recommendation is for the Navy and DoD as a whole to place serious emphasis on 
educating its contracting professionals regarding procurement fraud schemes and fraud 
awareness as well as areas vulnerable to procurement fraud.  
Conclusion 
In an environment of increased spending in government contracting for goods and 
services in the DoD, there is also an increased risk of public dollars being vulnerable to 
fraud, waste, and abuse (GAO, 2006). In addition, there is an increased risk of contracting 
organizations not getting the best value and not having contracting requirements met.  
Contract management deficiencies and related internal control weaknesses have 
resulted in procurement fraud within the DoD (GAO, 2006; DoDIG, 2009). The results of this 
research indicate that contracting professionals in the Navy scored low in their knowledge of 
procurement fraud (Grennan & McCrory, 2016). At the same time, the contracting 
professionals self-assessed that they had sufficient procurement fraud knowledge to deter 
and detect procurement fraud. The implications of the results of the analysis indicate that 
there is a need for making procurement fraud education available to contracting personnel in 
order to make them more aware of vulnerabilities to fraud in federal government 
procurement. 
This research investigated the Navy contracting professionals’ perception of their 
organization’s vulnerability to procurement fraud. This research indicates that the Navy 
contracting professionals’ limited knowledge of procurement fraud and their perception that 
their organization is not susceptible to fraud may reveal that the organization could in fact be 
vulnerable to procurement fraud as in the case of the Fat Leonard incidents, which are still 
under investigation.  
Overall, competent personnel, capable processes, and effective internal controls, 
which are the three components of the auditability triangle, may help federal agencies in 
their efforts to reduce, detect, and deter procurement fraud in their organizations throughout 
the Navy and DoD. In light of the potential fraud vulnerabilities within federal government 
contracting organizations, it is crucial that the Navy and DoD acquisition workforce have the 
necessary knowledge of procurement fraud schemes and procurement fraud indicators in 
order to help deter and detect procurement fraud and attain the best value for the 
government. As the federal government continues to increase procurement of goods and 
services, the pressure to reduce costs warrants federal agencies to strive to decrease its 
vulnerability to procurement fraud. 
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